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Abstract— So far, the problem of positioning in wireless net-
works has been studied mainly in a non-adversarial settings. In
this work, we analyze the resistance of positioning techniques to
position and distance spoofing attacks. We propose a mechanism
for secure positioning of wireless devices, that we call Verifiable
Multilateration. We then show how this mechanism can be used
to secure positioning in sensor networks. We analyze our system
through simulations. Keywords: Security, Positioning
I. INTRODUCTION
Researchers have proposed a number of positioning and
distance estimation techniques for wireless networks [41],
[42], [30], [3], [16], [6]. However, they all studied these
techniques in non-adversarial settings. Distance estimation and
positioning techniques are, nevertheless, highly vulnerable to
attacks from internal and external attackers. Internal attackers
can report false position and distance information in order to
cheat on their position. External attackers can modify (spoof)
the measured positions and distances of wireless nodes.
In this work, we propose a mechanism for the secure
position computation and verification of positions of wireless
devices. We call our mechanism Verifiable Multilateration
(VM). This mechanism is based on the measurements of the
time of radio signal propagation (i.e., time-of-flight (ToF)); it
consists of conventional multilateration with distance bound-
ing or authenticated ranging, and it enables verification of node
positions by a set of (at least three) base stations, which do
not need to be tightly synchronized.
In Verifiable Multilateration, we primarily make use of dis-
tance bounding protocols; however, Verifiable Multilateration
can also be used with conventional radio frequency time-of-
flight ranging techniques. We will show that by using ranging
instead of distance bounding, some security properties of the
Verifiable Multilateration mechanism can still be preserved.
Because of its simplicity, Verifiable Multilateration can be
used for securing positioning in a variety of systems. In this
work, we focus on sensor network positioning and we show
how Verifiable Multilateration can ensures secure positioning
of sensors in the presence of adversaries. We call this scheme
SPINE, a system for Secure Positioning In sensor NEtworks.
We present a security and performance analysis of SPINE.
The organization of the paper is the following. In Section II,
we review positioning techniques and analyze attacks against
them. In Section III, we describe a technique for radio fre-
quency distance bounding. In Section IV, we describe our
technique for position verification called Verifiable Multilat-
eration (VM). In Section V, we present a scheme for secure
positioning of a network of sensors. In Section VI, we present
an overview of current proposals and techniques for position-
ing in wireless networks, based on Verifiable Multilateration.
We conclude the paper in Section VII.
II. ATTACKS AGAINST POSITION AND DISTANCE
ESTIMATION TECHNIQUES
We now review positioning and distance estimation tech-
niques and analyze their vulnerabilities.
A. Attacker model
First, we briefly present our attacker model. We call an
attacker external if it cannot authenticate itself as an honest
network node to other network nodes or to a central authority.
We call an attacker internal if the node is compromised or
if the user controlling the node is malicious. We assume that
malicious and compromised nodes can authenticate themselves
to the authority and to other network nodes. We assume that
when a node is compromised, its secret keys and other secrets
that it shares with other nodes are known to the attacker.
Furthermore, we assume that users have full access to their
devices, meaning also to their authentication material.
Similarly, we observe two types of attacks: internal and
external. Internal attacks are those in which an internal at-
tacker reports a false position or convinces the positioning
infrastructure that it is at a false position. External attacks are
those in which an (external) attacker convinces an honest node
and the positioning infrastructure that the node is at a different
position from its true position (i.e. the attacker spoofs node’s
position).
We distinguish two types of positioning systems: node-
centric and infrastructure-centric. By a node-centric position-
ing system we mean that a node computes its position by ob-
serving signals received from public base stations with known
locations. If the positioning system is node-centric, internal
attacks are generally straightforward: the attacker simply lies
about the position that it computed. Infrastructure-centric posi-
tioning systems are those in which the infrastructure computes
positions of nodes based on their mutual communication.
In multilateration-based approaches, an internal attacker can
cheat on its position by cheating on ranging mechanisms (i.e.
by reporting false signal strengths and times of signal send-
ing/reception). In time difference-of-arrival (TDOA) systems,
an attacker can cheat by sending signals to base stations at
different times (in some cases, the attacker needs to have
directional antennas).
Attacks by external attackers are similar to those performed
by internal attackers. An external attacker can perform timing
attacks by delaying (through jamming) or speeding-up (worm-
hole attacks [19]) the signals, or it can perform power level
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modification attacks by replaying signals between nodes and
base stations at different power levels.
B. Attacks on Global Positioning System (GPS)
The Global Positioning System is today the most wide-
spread outdoor positioning system for mobile devices. The
system is based on a set of satellites that provide a three
dimensional positioning with an accuracy of around 3 m. GPS
also provides devices with an accurate time reference. GPS,
however, has several limitations: it cannot be used for indoor
positioning nor for positioning in dense urban regions: in
those cases, because of the interferences and obstacles, satellite
signals cannot reach the GPS devices. Furthermore, civilian
GPS was never designed for secure positioning. Civilian GPS
devices can be “spoofed” by GPS satellite simulators, that
produce fake satellite radio signals that are stronger than the
real signals coming from satellites. Most current GPS receivers
can be totally fooled, accepting these stronger signals while
ignoring the weaker, authentic signals. GPS satellite simulators
are legitimately used to test new GPS products and can be
bought for $10k-$50k or rented for just $1k per month. Some
simple software changes to most GPS receivers would permit
them to detect relatively unsophisticated spoofing attacks [43].
Nevertheless, more sophisticated spoofing attacks would still
be hard to detect. Military GPS are protected from position
spoofing by codes that cannot be reproduced by the attackers.
Even if a mobile node is able to obtain its correct position
from the GPS satellites, the authority or another mobile node
have no way to verify the correctness of node’s position,
unless the mobile node is equipped with a trusted software
or hardware module [2], providing the correct position.
C. Attacks on Ultrasound (US) positioning
Ultrasound-based systems operate by measuring ToF of the
sound signal measured between two nodes. An interesting
feature of these systems is that, if used with RF signals, they
do not require any time synchronization between the sender
and the receiver. The limitations of the US-based systems are
that, due to outdoor interferences, they can be mainly used
indoors.
US-based systems are vulnerable to distance reduction and
distance enlargement attacks by external and internal attacks.
To reduce the measured distance between two honest nodes,
two attackers can use a radio link, as it transmits the signal
several orders of magnitude faster than the US. Furthermore,
by jamming and replaying the signals at a later time, attackers
can enlarge the measured distances between honest nodes.
With US-based techniques, an internal attacker can also reduce
or enlarge the measured distance by laying about the signal
sending/reception times or by simply delaying its response
to honest nodes. Recently, Sastry, Shankar and Wagner [35]
have proposed a US-based distance bounding technique which
resists to distance reduction attacks from internal attacks; it
does not, however, resist to attacks from external nodes.
D. Attacks on Radio (RF) positioning
In techniques based on the Received Signal Strength (RSS),
the distance is computed based on the transmitted and received
signal strengths. To cheat on the measured distance, an internal
attacker therefore only needs to report a false power level to an
honest node. Malicious attackers can also modify the measured
distance between two honest nodes by jamming the nodes’
mutual communication and by replaying the messages with
higher or lower power strengths.
RF time-of-flight-based systems exhibit the best security
properties. In these systems, nodes measure their mutual
distance based on the time of propagation of the signal
between them. Because RF signals travel at the speed of
light, an attacker can, by jamming and replaying the signals,
only increase, but not decrease the measured time-of-flight
between the nodes. An internal attacker can further cheat
on the distance by laying about the signal transmission and
reception times.
An RF distance bounding technique proposed by Brands and
Chaum [4] exhibits better security properties than conventional
RF ToF distance estimation; it allows the nodes to upper
bound their distances to other nodes, meaning that it prevents
an internal attacker from reducing the measured distance. As
we will show in Section III in more detail, with RF ToF
distance-bounding protocols, attackers can only increase, but
not decrease the measured distances to honest nodes.
E. Conclusion
Our review of vulnerabilities of positioning systems is sum-
marized Table I. This table illustrates that the RF ToF-based
positioning solutions are best suited for secure positioning. The
RF ToF distance estimation and distance bounding techniques
are the most effective techniques to counter attacks. The reason
is that with RF it is generally possible to perform precise non-
line-of-sight distance estimations; the precision of the system
can be very high (15 cm error with Ultra Wide Band systems
at a distance of 2 km [12]). A potential drawback of these
3u : Generate random nonce Nu
: commitment (c, d) = commit(Nu)
u→ v : c
v : Generate random nonce Nv
v → u : Nv (bits sent from MSB to LSB)
u→ v : Nu
⊕
Nv (bits sent from LSB to MSB)
v: Measure time tvu between sending Nv
and receiving Nu
⊕
Nv
u→ v : Nu, Nv, d,MACKuv (u,Nu, Nv, d)
v: Verify MAC and verify if
Nu = open(c, d)
Fig. 1. Distance bounding protocol.
systems is that, because they operate with the speed of light,
the devices require fast-processing hardware.
III. DISTANCE BOUNDING AND AUTHENTICATED
RANGING
Distance bounding techniques are used to upper-bound the
distance of one device to another (compromised) device. As
we indicated in Table I, RF-based distance bounding protocols
are vulnerable to distance enlargement attacks but not to
distance reduction attacks. Distance bounding protocols are
used by a verifier v to verify that a claimant node u being at
a distance duv from a verifier node v, cannot claim to be at a
distance d′uv < duv . These protocols were first introduced by
Brands and Chaum [4] to prevent Mafia Fraud attacks.
The pseudocode of the distance bounding protocol is shown
in Figure 1. In the first step of the protocol, the claimant u
commits to a random value Nu. The verifier replies with a
challenge nonce Nv , sends it to u in a reverse bit order and
starts its timer as soon as the last bit of the challenge has been
sent. The claimant u responds immediately with Nv
⊕
Nu,
upon receiving the challenge from v. Once the verifier has
received the response from u it stops the timer and converts
the challenge-response time tvu to a distance dvu. In the last
step of the protocol, u authenticates itself to v and reveals the
decommit value dˆ. The authentication and the authenticity of
d is ensured with a message authentication code (MAC), using
a secret key Kvu that u and v share. Finally, v verifies if the
value Nu received in the time-measuring phase corresponds
to the received (commit, decommit) pair (c, dˆ).
The commitment scheme needs to satisfy two properties:
(i) a user who commits to a certain value cannot change this
value afterwards (we say that the scheme is binding), (ii)
the commitment is hidden from its receiver until the sender
“opens” it (we say that the scheme is hiding). A commitment
scheme transforms a value m into a commitment/opening pair
(c, d), where c reveals no information about m, but (c, d)
together reveal m, and it is infeasible to find dˆ such that (c, dˆ)
reveals mˆ = m. Simple commitment schemes can be realized
with hash functions, which do not impose high computational
requirements on sensor nodes.
The described protocol is suitable for devices that can
perform rapid message exchanges, execute XOR operations
rapidly, and perform encryption. In the case of RF-based
distance bounding, the most important assumptions are that
u : Generate random nonce Nu
: commitment (c, d) = commit(Nu)
u→ v : c
v : Generate random nonce Nv
v(tvs)→ (tur )u : Nv
u(tus )→ (tvr)v : Nu
⊕
Nv
u→ v : tus , tur , d,MACKuv (u,Nu, Nv, tus , tur , d)
v: Verify MAC and verify if
Nu = open(c, d)
v: Compute d = (tvr − tvs − tus + tur )s
Fig. 2. Authenticated ranging protocol.
the claimant needs to be able to bound its processing (XOR)
to a few nanoseconds, and that the verifier v needs to be able
to measure time with nanosecond precision (1ns corresponds
to the time that it takes an electromagnetic wave to propagate
over 30 cm). This requirement allows the node to perform
distance bounding with radio signals with an uncertainty of
30 cm. We are aware that a nanosecond processing and time
measurements are achievable only with dedicated hardware.
Recent developments in location system show that RF time of
flight systems based on Ultra Wide Band (UWB) can achieve
nanosecond precision of measured times of signal flight (and
consequently of the distances). The tests with Multispectral
solution’s UWB Precision Asset Location system [13] consist-
ing of active tags and tracking devices show that this system
can provide two- and three-dimensional location of objects to
within a few centimeters. The range of the system is 100 m
indoor and 2km outdoor. The used UWB tags are active and
roughly the size of a wristwatch, weighing approximately 40
grams each.
In the case of a US-based distance bounding, node process-
ing speed and clock accuracy can be of the order of mil-
liseconds. Thus, US distance bounding can be easily imple-
mented with off-the-shelf components such as microphones
and 802.11 wireless cards [35].
Authenticated ranging protocols enable two honest and
trusted parties to measure their mutual distance in an authen-
ticated manner. Figure 2 shows one possible realization of the
authenticated distance ranging protocol, inspired by Brand’s
and Chaum’s distance bounding protocol. Here, tus , tur and
tvs , t
v
r are the message sending and reception times at nodes u
and v, respectively; s is the speed of light.
In this protocol, unlike in the distance bounding protocol, it
is not required that the claimant replies within a nanosecond
time, but only that it is able to measure time with that
precision. Given that the claimant and the verifier are mutually
trusted, the claimant (u) reports its processing time to the
verifier (v) which then computes the range based on the
reported times using speed of light.
Like in the distance bounding protocol, in this protocol, the
processing at the nodes is minimized during the ranging phase,
and most processing (MAC and commitment verification) is
performed a posteriori to the ranging.
The advantages of the ranging protocol over distance bound-
ing are in that the nodes do not need to have high-speed hard-
ware to perform XOR and that the channel does not need to be
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Fig. 3. Examples of Verifiable Multilateration. a) with three verifiers. b) with
six verifiers.
reserved during the ranging phase (as processing and channel
access times are measured and reported). One disadvantage is
that ranging is not resistant to distance reduction by internal
attackers.
A very important observation here is that, essentially, au-
thenticated ranging and distance bounding have the same
resistance to external attackers: the only attack that the external
attackers can successfully perform is distance enlargement. In
case of internal attackers, distance bounding prevents distance
reduction, whereas the authenticated ranging is vulnerable to
this attack.
IV. VERIFIABLE MULTILATERATION
In Section II, we described security problems related to
various positioning and distance estimation techniques and in
Section III we showed how the devices can upper-bound their
mutual distances. We now propose a technique for position
verification that we call Verifiable Multilateration (VM). This
technique enables a secure computation and verification of the
positions of mobile devices in the presence of attackers. Here,
by secure position computation we mean that base stations
compute the correct position of a node in the presence of
attacker, or that a node can compute its own position in the
presence of an attacker; by secure position verification we
mean that the base stations can verify the position reported by
the node.
Multilateration is a technique for determining the position
of a (mobile) device from a set of reference points whose
positions are known, based on the ranges measured between
the reference points and the device. The position of the
device in two (three) dimensions can be computed if the
device measured its distance to three (four) reference points.
As we already detailed in Section II, distance estimation
techniques are vulnerable to attacks from internal and external
attacks, which can maliciously modify the measured distances.
Multilateration is equally vulnerable to the same set of attacks
because it relies on distance estimations.
A. Algorithm
Verifiable Multilateration relies on distance bounding (or on
authenticated ranging). It consists of distance bound measure-
ments from at least three reference points (verifiers) to the
mobile device (the claimant) and of subsequent computations
performed by an authority. In this description, we will assume
that the verification is performed with distance bounding.
For simplicity, we show the algorithm for two dimensional
positioning; at the end of the section, we briefly comment
on how a similar algorithm can be applied to the three
dimensional case.
The intuition behind the verifiable multilateration algorithm
is the following. Because of the distance bounding property,
the claimant can only pretend that it is more distant from the
verifier than it really is. If it increases the measured distance
to one of the verifiers, in order to keep the position consistent,
the claimant needs to prove that at least one of the measured
distances to other verifiers is shorter than it actually is, which it
cannot because of the distance bounding. This property holds
only if the position of the claimant is determined within the
triangle formed by the verifiers. This can be explained with
a simple example: if an object is located within the triangle,
and it moves to a different position within the triangle, it will
certainly reduce its distance to at least one of the triangle
vertices. The same properties hold if an external attacker
enlarges distances between verifiers and an honest claimant.
This basic intuition is illustrated in Figure 3a.
More precisely, the verifiable multilateration algorithm is
executed by the verifiers as shown on Figure 4.
T = Ø; set of verification triangles enclosing u
V = {v1, ..., vn}; set of verifiers in the power range of u
1 For all vi ∈ V , perform distance bounding
from vi to u and obtain dbi
2 With all vi ∈ V , compute the estimate (x′u, y′u) of the position
by MMSE
3 If for all vi ∈ V , |dbi −
 
(xi − x′u)2 + (yi − y′u)2| ≤ δ then
for all (vi, vj , vk) ∈ V3, if (x′u, y′u) ∈ (vi, vj , vk)
then T = T ∪ (vi, vj , vk)
if |T | > 0 then position is accepted and xu = x′u, yu = y′u
else the position is rejected
else the position is rejected
Fig. 4. Verifiable multilateration
In step 1 of the algorithm, the verifiers v1, ..., vn which are
in the power range of the claimant u perform distance bound-
ing to the claimant u and obtain distance bounds db1, ..., dbn.
These distance bounds as well as the positions of the verifiers
(which are known) are then reported to the central authority.
In step 2, the authority computes an estimate (x′, y′) of the
claimant’s position; this position is computed by using distance
bounds from all verifiers in u’s neighborhood, typically by the
Minimum Mean Square Estimate (MMSE):
Let fi(x′u, y′u) = dbi −
 
(xi − x′u)2 + (yi − y′u)2
The position of u is obtained by minimizing
F (x′u, y
′
u) =

vi∈T f
2
i (x
′
u, y
′
u)
over all estimates of u
In step 3 of the algorithm, the authority runs the following
two tests: (i) δ-test: for all vi, does the distance between
(x′u, y
′
u) and vi differ from the measured distance bound dbi
5by less than the expected distance measurement error δ and
(ii) point in the triangle test: does (x′u, y′u) fall within at least
one physical triangle formed by a triplet of verifiers. Note also
that we call the triangle formed by the verifiers the verification
triangle. If both the δ and the point in the triangle tests are
positive, the authority accepts the estimated position (x′u, y′u)
of the claimant as correct; else, the position is rejected.
The expected error δ is a system parameter that depends
on the number of verifiers and on the distance estimation
techniques used. This error becomes smaller as more verifiers
are used to compute (x′u, y′u).
If both the δ and the point in the triangle tests are positive,
this means that the claimant falls in at least one verification
triangle vi, vj , vk, and that distance bounds (dbi, dbj , dbk) are
consistent with the estimated position and with each other
(Figure 3a). This means that none of the distance bounds
(dbi, dbj , dbk) were enlarged.
If any of the distance-bounds dbi differs from the estimated
position (x′u, y′u) by more than δ, this indicates that there is
a possible distance enlargement attack on one or more of the
distance bounds that caused such an unexpectedly high error
to occur. If a larger number of verification triangles can be
formed around u, the authority can try to detect which of the
distances are enlarged. Those distances can then be filtered-out
and the position can be computed with the remaining set of
distances. This detection is performed such that the position
of u is computed independently in each triangle. If in a given
triangle the computation is successful, then all the distance
bounds from the verifiers forming that triangle are considered
correct; otherwise, all three distance bounds are considered
suspicious (see Figure 5).
C = Ø; set of verifiers with correctly measured bounds
NC = Ø; set of verifiers whose bounds are suspicious
1 For all vi ∈ T
if in at least one of the verification triangles
with vi the position of u is computed correctly
then dbi is correct, C = C ∪ {vi}
else NC = NC ∪ {vi}
2 For all vi ∈ NC
if vi can create a verification triangle
with any pair (vj , vk) ∈ C2
then dbi is subject to an enlargement attack
3 With all vi ∈ C, compute the estimate (x′u, y′u) of the position
by MMSE
4 For all vi ∈ NC, if |dbi −
 
(xi − x′u)2 + (yi − y′u)2| ≤ δ
then dbi is subject to an enlargement attack
Fig. 5. Detection of enlarged distances.
In this algorithm, the number of verification triangles and
the number of enlarged distances will determine if the algo-
rithm can detect which distance(s) is(are) enlarged. Neverthe-
less, in all cases, even if the number of verifiers is strictly equal
to three, the Verifiable Multilateration algorithm will detect
any distance enlargement attack (even if only one distance
is enlarged), but it will not always be able to detect which
distance it is.
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Fig. 6. Device cloning/user collusion. The attacker clones a device u and
places one clone close to each verifier. The clones seem to the verifiers as
a single device and can use distance enlargement to show that u is at any
position within the verification triangle. Alternatively, three users collude in
proving an incorrect position of node u.
Verifiable Multilateration can be also applied to three di-
mensional positioning. For this, the system requires a mini-
mum of four verifiers, that form a triangular pyramid, within
which the secure determination of the claimant’s position is
possible. The algorithm is then executed in a way similar to
the two-dimensional case.
B. Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze the security properties of
verifiable multilateration in various scenarios. We observe
verifiable multilateration with distance bounding or with
authenticated ranging, assuming trusted or un-trusted users,
and with radio-based or ultrasound-based bounding/ranging.
Verifiable Multilateration with distance-bounding
The most important properties of the Verifiable Multilateration
mechanism with distance-bounding can be summarized as
follows:
1) A node located at position p within the triangle/pyramid
formed by the verifiers cannot prove to be at another
position p′ = p within the same triangle/pyramid.
2) A node located outside the triangle/pyramid cannot
prove to be at any position p within the triangle/pyramid.
3) An external attacker performing a distance enlargement
attack cannot trick the verifiers into believing that a
claimant located at a location p in the triangle/pyramid
is located at some other position p′ = p in the trian-
gle/pyramid.
4) An external attacker performing a distance enlargement
attack cannot trick the verifiers into believing that a
claimant is located at any position p within the trian-
gle/pyramid, if the claimant is located outside of the
triangle/pyramid.
These properties hold for verifiable multilateration based
on radio distance bounding (VM-RF-DB) in environments in
which the signal propagates at the speed of light, and for an
internal attacker that controls a single device (the claimant).
VM-RF-DB therefore resists to external attacks and to internal
attacks from a single un-trusted/compromised node.
However, if an attacker owns several devices and each
device can authenticate to the authority as the same en-
6external attackers single internal attacker single internal + external attackers colluding internal/cloning internal
VM-RF-DB + DF yes yes yes yes
VM-RF-DB yes yes yes no
VM-US-DB no (yes UW) yes no no
VM-RF-AR yes no no no
VM-US-AR no (yes UW) no no no
TABLE II
RESISTANCE OF VERIFIABLE MULTILATERATION (VM) TO ATTACKS. RF=RADIO COMMUNICATION, US=ULTRASONIC COMMUNICATION,
DB=DISTANCE-BOUNDING, AR=AUTHENTICATED RANGING, DF=DEVICE FINGERPRINTING, UW=UNDERWATER.
tity, the attacker can still successfully cheat on its position.
The attacker can place three/four devices within the trian-
gle/triangular pyramid, such that each device is close to one
of the verifiers. Each of the devices can then show to its
corresponding base station (by delaying the messages) that it
is positioned at any distance larger than their actual distance
(which is small). As to the base stations these devices appear
to be a single claimant, the attacker can prove to be at any
distance to the base stations, and thus at any position in the
verification triangle/triangular pyramid. This attack is shown
on Figure 6. Here, the attacker clones its device, or three
attackers collude to appear as a single node to the verifiers.
This enables the attacker (or colluding nodes) to prove that
the position of the claimant is at an incorrect place within the
verification triangle.
A solution that prevents this attack is to make claimant
devices tamper-proof such that their authentication material
is not revealed to the attacker and that they cannot be cloned;
however, as shown in [2], tamper-proofness has its limitations.
Another possibility is that the base stations perform device
fingerprinting [37] by which they identify each device as
unique. In that case, the base stations can identify a claimant
device by the unique “fingerprint” that characterizes its signal
transmission1.
Verifiable multilateration with ultrasonic distance bounding
(VM-US-DB) in air, exhibits only properties (1) and (2),
meaning that it protects the positioning system from an
un-trusted claimant, but not against an external attacker nor
from colluding internal attackers (claimants). However, if the
devices are under water, VM-US-DB can exhibit the same
properties as VM-RF-DB; this is because, underwater, the
communication is limited to ultrasonic signals. VM-US-DB
can be attacked if an attacker can use surface wormholes to
perform distance reduction [22].
Verifiable Multilateration with authenticated ranging
Verifiable multilateration with radio authenticated ranging
(VM-RF-AR) exhibits only properties 3 and 4 of the VM-
RF-DB. This means that this scheme provides protection
against external attacks, but not against un-trusted claimants
(internal attackers). VM-RF-AR is therefore most suitable for
secure positioning systems in which the infrastructure (the
verifiers) and the users (the claimants) are mutually trusted. In
these scenarios, VM-RF-AR resists to all distance enlargement
1This process is used by cellular network operators to prevent cloning fraud;
namely, a cloned phone does not have the same fingerprint as the legal phone
with the same electronic identification numbers.
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Fig. 7. Standard deviation (σ) of the position computed with MMSE of
distance measurements to a UWB tag, performed by three UWB base stations.
Positioning is performed within a triangle formed by the three base stationss.
attacks by external attackers.
Verifiable multilateration with ultrasonic authenticated rang-
ing (VM-US-AR) exhibits the same properties as VM-RF-AR,
but only in underwater communications, whereas in air, it does
not provide any security at all.
The results of this analysis are summarized in Table II.
C. Maximum Attacker Impact
In this section we analyze the impact of distance mea-
surement errors on Verifiable Multilateration. As we have
already described, for the computed position to be accepted
by the verifiers, each distance bound needs to be less than
δ different from the distance between the computed position
and the verifier measuring that distance bound. We defined
δ as the expected positioning error. Here, we define δ more
precisely as 3σ, where σ is the expected standard deviation
of the computed position. This means that we expect, with
probability of 0.997 (the confidence interval corresponding to
3σ) that the real node position will lay in the circle of radius
3σ around the computed position x′u, y′u.
Within the Verifiable Multilateration this means that the
maximal attacker impact on the computed position is upper-
bounded by 3σ.
To estimate the expected σ of an UWB positioning system,
we used the results of the distance measurements between
7UWB base stations and UWB tags, published by Multispectral
Solutions [1]. These results show that for indoor positioning,
the standard deviation of the measured distances increases with
the distance length. The measured distances were from 0 to 50
m, and the standard deviation was from 0 to 1 m. From these
distance measurements, we computed the standard deviation of
the positions within a verifiable triangle formed by the three
base stations. The results of this computation are shown on
Figure 7. The values on the x and y axis denote the measured
positions, and the z axis denotes the standard deviation of
the position. We observe that the standard deviation is the
highest at positions close to the base stations. This is an
expected result, due to geometric dilution of precision. It is
also important to observe that the value of σ is lower than 0.5
m in the center part of the triangle, and that it increases to 1
m for positions closer to the base stations.
Given that the verifiers do not know a priory if the position
that they computed is correct or not, VM cannot operate with
δ, as it depends on the computed position. This is notably
because we do not want to give any advantage to the attacker
by allowing him to modify the distances (the position) in order
to influence the choice of δ. VM therefore needs to operate in a
“worst case” scenario with a fixed value for δ. This also means
that δ needs to be chosen such that the positions which are
not spoofed are not likely to be rejected, and that the positions
which are spoofed are detected.
It is important to notice that by choosing δ, the verifiers are
sure that the positions at which 3σ ≤ δ will not be rejected
if there was no attack on the distances. This means that by
choosing different δs, the verifiers will modify the verification
area; for larger δ, the verification region will be larger, but so
will be the maximum attacker impact.
D. Location Privacy
So far, we have described the infrastructure-based verifi-
able multilateration (IB-VM), in which the verifiers compute
the position of the claimant. IB-VM does not preserve the
claimant’s location privacy. There are two reasons for that.
The first reason is that the verifiers compute the position of
the claimant, and therefore have full knowledge of where the
claimant is located. The second reason is that the described
distance bounding and ranging protocols are vulnerable to
attacks by fake verifiers whose goal is to detect the position
of a node by initiating the execution of the distance-bounding
protocol. This second problem can be eliminated If the ver-
ifiers are authenticated to the claimants prior to the distance
verification. In [38], Capkun et al., proposed a protocol for
mutually authenticated distance bounding (MAD) that enables
two nodes to determine their mutual distance bounds at the
time of encounter. This protocol can be used to prevent attacks
by fake verifiers.
Still, even with mutual claimant-verifier authentication IB-
VM does not fully protect the claimant’s location privacy,
because the infrastructure knows the location of the claimant.
This problem can be solved through Node-based Verifiable
Multilateration (NB-VM). In this protocol, the claimant per-
forms distance bounding to the verifiers, and computes its
location within the verification triangle in the same way as in
the protocol in Figure 4. Here, the claimant trusts the verifiers
about their positions, but not does allow them to find out its
position. However, the verifiers could try to infer the claimant’s
position based on the readings of the strengths of the signals
received from the claimant. This, and similar attacks on node’s
location privacy have been previously investigated [31], [15],
[33], [34], [20], [21], but thwarting these attacks is out of the
scope of this paper.
V. SECURE POSITIONING IN SENSOR NETWORKS
In this section, we review attacks on sensor network
positioning systems. We then propose solutions for secure
positioning in sensor networks.
A. Threat analysis
Threats on positioning in sensor networks are more severe
than if positioning is performed directly by trusted base sta-
tions. This is because of the distributed nature of the majority
of sensor network positioning algorithms. Namely, to reduce
the number of trusted base stations needed to position all the
sensors in the network, most of the positioning algorithms rely
on sensor cooperation for computing node positions.
One of the most obvious threats to sensor networks is
the physical displacement of nodes. An external attacker can
physically displace nodes from their original positions to other
positions in the network, or can temporarily or permanently
remove the nodes from the network while this remains un-
detected to the nodes or to the network authority. If the
network is not properly protected, an attacker can create the
impression to the displaced node and to its neighbors that the
node did not move; a simple approach for the attacker is to
create a communication link to the new position of the honest
node. This attack, that we call the node displacement attack
is illustrated in Figure 8, case a).
Even without displacing the nodes, external attackers can
still perform a number of attacks on node positions and net-
work topology. An example of this behavior is the wormhole
attack shown in Figure 8, case b), by which the attacker
establishes links between nodes that are not in each others’
power range. Besides the establishment of new links, attack-
ers can permanently or temporarily jam the communication
between pairs of nodes and thus by remove links that would
normally exist. Furthermore, an attacker can jam and replay
the messages between the nodes and therefore enlarge the
distances between the nodes (Figure 8, case c).
Attacks by internal attackers are simpler to perform and can
be more harmful than those performed by external attackers.
Internal attackers can modify the computed network topology
by reporting non-existing links, or by not establishing or not
reporting the links that would normally be established. The
false position and distance dissemination attack is illustrated
in Figure 8, case d).
B. System Model
Our secure positioning system consists of a set of sensor
nodes and a set of reference nodes (landmarks) with known
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Fig. 8. Attacks on sensor network positioning.
locations. Nodes and verifiers communicate using radio trans-
missions. We assume that the radio link between neighbors is
bidirectional.
We assume that the sensor nodes have distance-measuring
capabilities, but are not equipped with GPS receivers. The
nodes are able to measure the distances to their neighbors or
to the landmarks by using time-of-arrival or round-trip time
measurements with radio signals. The nodes are also able to
bound their processing delays to a few nanoseconds.
We assume that the network is operated by an authority.
The authority controls the network membership and assigns
a unique identity to each node. Each node is able to gen-
erate symmetric cryptographic keys and, more generally, to
accomplish any task required to secure its communications.
All network nodes can establish pairwise secret keys. This can
be achieved by manually pre-loading all keys into the nodes
in a network setup phase, by probabilistic key pre-distribution
schemes [11], [7], or through an on-line key distribution
center [18].
We observe two scenarios. In the first scenario, sensors are
positioned directly by the landmark stations. In the second
scenario, the sensor cooperate to compute their positions and
the number of landmarks is significantly smaller.
C. Direct Sensor Positioning
If the sensors are being positioned directly by the land-
mark stations (verifiers), secure positioning is straightforward
through the application of verifiable multilateration. This can
be enabled by a network of landmarks which can be fixed, with
predetermined positions, randomly distributed over the area
of interest, or even mobile. The number of verifiers needed to
cover an area, such that position verification can be performed
in the whole area, depends on the number of verifiers and their
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Fig. 9. Number of verifiers required to cover an area (L×L) with verification
triangles. The power range is 250 m.
(and mobile nodes’) power ranges. So far, we have assumed
that the power range of each verifier can cover the verification
triangle and that the position verification is thus enabled in
the whole triangle. This is, however, not true in general; the
verification triangle is the largest possible region in which
three verifiers can verify node positions. If the power ranges of
the verifiers are such that they do not cover the whole triangle,
the verification region can be smaller than the verification
triangle. Only if the verifiers are in each others’ power ranges
will the verification region be equal to the verification triangle.
For this reason, the optimal way to cover an area of interest
is to place verifiers within the area such that they form regular
triangles with sides equal to their power ranges. In this case,
the number n of verifiers needed to cover a square area of
L× L is
n = [2L/R + 3][2L/R + 1]/2
9where L is the area width and length and R is the power
range of the verifiers and mobile nodes. In this way, each
verifier (except for the boundary verifiers) will be a verifier in
six triangles (i.e., in a hexagon).
We now consider the case in which, instead of being pre-
deployed on fixed locations, the verifiers are uniformly dis-
tributed over the area of interest. We performed simulations to
determine the number of verifiers necessary to cover the area.
This coverage will depend on the sizes and the positions of the
verification triangles formed by the verifiers. Our simulations
were performed on areas of variable sizes (from 500× 500 to
2000 × 2000 m2 with verifiers power ranges of 250 m). To
avoid boundary effects, the verifiers were uniformly distributed
in the area and in a boundary region outside the area, whose
width was 10% of the area width.
The results of an average of 100 simulations are shown in
Figure 9 and are displayed with confidence intervals of 95%.
As expected, an optimal placement of verifiers is much more
efficient than their random placement, in terms of number of
verifiers.
However, for security purposes, in some scenarios, it might
be advantageous for the verifiers to be randomly placed, to
randomly move within the area of interest and thus not to
have their positions known at all times. Verifier mobility could
also prevent the cloning attack. If the sensors are mobile,
their trajectories can be reconstructed based on the verified
positions [17].
D. Cooperative Positioning: SPINE
In some application scenarios, a larger number of landmarks
cannot be deployed, or is expensive to deploy. For those
scenarios, we propose a secure cooperative positioning mech-
anism called SPINE: Secure Positioning for sensor NEtworks
algorithm. SPINE is based on Verifiable Multilateration. The
algorithm is executed in three phases: (i) the sensors measure
distance bounds to their neighbors, (ii) the distance bounds
are verified through verifiable multilateration and (iii) the
positions of the nodes are computed by the sensors using
a distributed algorithm, or by the central authority, using a
centralized positioning algorithm. SPINE algorithm is shown
on Figure 10.
VD = {Ø}; set of verifiable distance bounds
NV = {Ø}; set of non-verifiable distance bounds
DB = {all distance bounds}
For all distances dbi ∈ DB
if dbi can be verified with BDV then VD = VD ∪ {dbi}
else NV = NV ∪ {dbi}
Compute the positions of the nodes with dbi ∈ VD
Compare the computed positions with dbi ∈ NV
Fig. 10. SPINE algorithm.
BDV stands for Basic Distance Verification (BDV) (Fig-
ure 11); it relies on Verifiable Multilateration. The BDV of
the distance between v and u is performed by (i) forming
verification triangles around u with v and its neighbors, (ii)
by forming verification triangles around v with u and its
v6
v2
v5
v1
v3
v4
u v
Fig. 11. Basic distance verification (BDV). To verify a distance, a set of
triangles is formed around the distance.
neighbors and (iii) by forming verifiable triangles around u and
v. In our example, the following triangles are formed around
v: (u, v1, v2), (u, v3, v4), (u, v1, v4), and (u, v2, v3);
only a single triangle (v, v5, v6) is formed around u. Finally,
a triangle (v4, v5, v6) is formed around both u and v. After
forming the triangles, the measured distance bounds dbuv
(from u to v) and dbvu (from v to u) are verified in all
triangles, by performing verifiable multilateration over u and
v, respectively. This is done in such a way that the nodes
forming a triangle define a local coordinate system, in which
they then compute the position of u or v, or the positions of
both u and v. The computation of the position of u and v
is performed with verifiable multilateration through which the
distance bounds dbuv and dbvu are then verified. Verification
of the distance bound is successful within BDV only if in all
verification triangles the measured distance bounds dbuv and
dbvu match the computed positions (with a tolerance of δ).
The algorithm is executed as shown on Figure 12.
u measures dbuv and v measures dbvu
1 Triangles are formed with v and its neighbors;
US is the set of triangles enclosing u
2 Triangles are formed with u and its neighbors;
VS is the set of triangles enclosing v
3 Triangles are formed with neighbors of u and v;
UVS is the set of triangles enclosing u and v
4 In all  ∈ US ∪ VS ∪ UVS compute duv with VM
5 If for all  ∈ US ∪ VS ∪ UVS , |duv − dbuv| ≤ δ
and |dvu − dbuv| ≤ δ, then {dbuv, dbvu} are verified
else dbuv, dbvu cannot be verified
Fig. 12. Basic distance verification.
The set VD contains those distance bounds that can be
verified by at least one triangle. The distance bounds that
cannot be verified are included into a set VD of non-verified
distances. Once the selection process is finished, the positions
of the nodes can be computed by using only verified distances
from the set VD. Finally, the computed positions of the nodes
are compared with the non-verified distances from NV .
The computation of the positions of the nodes can be
performed by a number of centralized or distributed range-
based positioning algorithms (see Section VI). Note here that
the BDV algorithm can be executed locally as the nodes
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forming a triangle are in each other’s power ranges.
The effectiveness of any of the used positioning techniques
(and consequently of SPINE) depends on the number of node
neighbors (node density) and on the number and the spatial
distribution of landmarks. The number of node neighbors is
crucial to ensure that the positions of most of the nodes can be
computed. The requirements for secure positioning are higher:
it is necessary that the network is sufficiently dense to ensure
that the positions of most nodes can be securely computed.
To show the difference between the density requirements for
secure and non-secure positioning, we observe average number
of distance bounds to the neighbors that can be verified with
BDV (the distances that are used for secure positioning), and
the average number of node neighbors (the distances used for
non-secure positioning). We performed simulations on an area
of 100× 100m, with 50 to 500 uniform randomly distributed
nodes with power ranges of 25 m. The results are presented
in Figure 13 with 95% confidence intervals.
As expected, the results show that to perform secure posi-
tioning equivalently to non-secure positioning (meaning with
approximately the same number of distances), a higher density
of nodes is required. For non-secure positioning, an average
of 10 distances per node (10 neighbors) is reached already
with 80 nodes/100× 100 m2, whereas for secure positioning,
an average of 10 verifiable distances requires at least 110
nodes/100× 100 m2.
We further computed the average percentage of nodes
covered by at least one verification triangle. These results
are shown in Figure 14. This figure is important as it shows
that at node density of 120 nodes/100× 100 m2, most of the
nodes are covered by at least one verification triangle, meaning
that their adjacent distances and their position can be verified.
As expected, the figure shows that the boundary nodes are
not covered by verification triangles. This is an important
indication that the landmark stations need to be specifically
placed at the boundaries of the area to protect boundary nodes
from attacks by enabling the formation of verification triangles
around them.
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Fig. 15. Example of distance enlargement attack by external nodes on
a single-triangle BDV. Distance duv a) before enlargement and b) after
enlargement.
E. Security Analysis
The resistance of SPINE relies on the resistance of BDV to
attacks; it depends on the ability of the attacker to modify the
verified distances, but also on the positioning algorithm used
to compute node positions with verified distances.
Here, we primarily analyze the resistance of BDV to attacks.
We then discuss security implications of using BDV with
several positioning algorithms.
The resistance of BDV to attacks depends on the number
and on the mutual dependance of triangles that are formed
around the distance. To spoof a distance verified by a single
triangle, it is sufficient for an external attacker to enlarge
two distances (the distance duv , and one additional distance
between the nodes forming a triangle). This is illustrated
on Figure 15, where distances duv and d1 are enlarged.
By enlarging these two distances, all the distances in the
verification triangle remain mutually consistent. This attack
can be performed by an external attacker.
If only a single node in a triangle is compromised, this node
can enlarge distances to the claimant and to other nodes form-
ing the verification triangle. This is illustrated on Figure 16. In
this example, node v is compromised, and enlarges distances
to u, v2 and to v3 such that all the distances in the verification
triangle remain mutually consistent. Similarly to the attack on
Figure 15, if the attacker controls one compromised and one
external node, it can enlarge the measured distance even if
the compromised node is not adjacent to the distance. This
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Fig. 16. An example of a distance enlargement attack by a compromised
node (v) on a single-triangle BDV. Distance duv a) before enlargement and
b) after enlargement.
essentially means that a single-triangle BDV resists only to
attacks that enlarge only a single distance.
If k verification triangles can be formed around a distance,
the resistance of BDV to attacks can be expressed in terms of
k. If the triangles are node-disjoint, then BDV resists to up to
2k distance enlargements. This is intuitive, as the distance is
verified by k disjoint triangles, and an attacker needs to spoof
the verification process in each of the triangles to successful
cheat on the measured distance.
If the triangles are node-joint and edge-disjoint, then BDV
also resists to up to 2k distance enlargements by external
attackers, but it does not resist attacks by a single compromised
node adjacent to the spoofed distance. Essentially, if all
triangles have a common (compromised) node, the distance
adjacent to that node can be successfully spoofed. We note
here, however, that the triangles formed around a distance are
almost never node-joint, given that some are formed with u
and its neighbors around v, others are formed with v and its
neighbors around u, whereas the third set of triangles is formed
by the neighbors of u and v around the two nodes.
If the triangles are edge-joint, then BDV resists to up to k+1
distance enlargements by external attackers. If the nodes are
positioned favorably for the attacker, the attacker can enlarge
the joint edge and enlarge one additional edge from every
triangle. We note here that this attack will not always be
possible.
Colluding internal (and external) attackers are the most
serious threat to BDV. These attackers can modify arbitrarily
the distances and help each-other in providing consistently
incorrect distance and position information. The number of
such attackers needed to cheat on distances depends on the
number of nodes forming triangles around a particular dis-
tance. Typically, colluding internal attackers need to share
mutual authentication material and need to be placed close
to the verifiers to perform a successful attack.
We performed simulations on a network of sensors with den-
sities from 50 to 500 nodes/100× 100 m2 and a power range
of 25 m. We computed the average number of verification
triangles and an average number of edge-disjoint verification
triangles that can be formed around a distance. The results
show that BDV, depending on the node density and node
positions, can resist to attacks up to 100 distance enlargements.
To compromise the computation of the position of a single
node, an attacker needs to modify the computation and the
edge-disjoint triangles
Fig. 17. An average number of verification triangles and an average number
of edge-disjoint verification triangles that can be formed around a distance.
verification of the (verified) distances surrounding the node.
Furthermore, the attacker needs to make all the modified
distances and positions consistent with the positions of other
nodes in the network. The difficulty for the attacker here is in
distance enlargement. Essentially, when the attacker enlarges
distances, it makes some nodes to appear further from each
other, but also makes some unavoidably to appear closer. This
is why in a very dense network, the attacker could only scale-
up all the distances in the network, but it would not be able
to, by changing a smaller number of distances, successfully
modify the computed positions of the nodes.
VI. RELATED WORK
In the last decade, a number of indoor positioning systems
were proposed, based notably on infrared [41], ultrasound [42],
[30], received radio signal strength [3], [16], [6] and time-of-
flight radio signal propagation techniques [25], [12]. These
positioning techniques were then extended and used for posi-
tioning in wireless ad hoc networks [9], [5], [39], [29], [32],
[36], [28], [10], [8].
Recently, a number of secure distance and location verifi-
cation have been proposed. Brands and Chaum [4] proposed
a distance bounding protocol that can be used to verify
the proximity of two devices connected by a wired link.
Sastry, Shankar and Wagner [35] proposed a new distance
bounding protocol, based on ultrasound and radio wireless
communication. In that work, the authors also propose to
make use of multiple base stations to narrow down the area
in which the nodes lie. However, as this proposal is based on
ultrasound distance bounding, it can therefore be used only
for the verification of nodes’ positions, and only if external
nodes have no access to the area of interest. In [19], the
authors propose a mechanism called “packet leashes” that
aims at preventing wormhole attacks by making use of the
geographic location of the nodes (geographic leashes), or
of the transmission time of the packet between the nodes
(temporal leashes). Kuhn [23] proposed an asymmetric secu-
rity mechanism for navigation signals. That proposal aims at
securing systems like GPS [14]. Lazos et al. [24] proposed a
set of techniques for secure positioning of a network of sensors
based on directional antennas and distance bounding. Li et
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al. [26] propose statistical methods for securing localization in
wireless sensor networks. Liu et al. [27] propose techniques
for the detection of malicious attacks against beacon-based
location discovery in sensor networks, based on consistency
of received beacons. In [40], Capkun et al. propose a secure
localization scheme based on hidden and mobile base stations,
which makes use of the unpredictability of the base station
locations.
Recently, a number of proposals have been made to protect
the anonymity and location privacy of wireless devices [31],
[15], [33], [34], [20], [21].
VII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have analyzed positioning and distance
estimation techniques in adversarial settings. We have shown
that most proposed positioning techniques are vulnerable to
position spoofing attacks from internal and external attackers.
We have further shown that positioning and distance estimation
techniques, based on radio signal propagation, exhibit the
best properties for position verification. We have proposed a
novel mechanism for position verification, called Verifiable
Multilateration (VM). Verifiable Multilateration enables for
the secure computation and verification of node positions in
the presence of attackers. We have further proposed SPINE,
a system for secure positioning in a network of sensors,
based on Verifiable Multilateration. We have shown that this
system resists against distance modification attacks from a
large number of attacker nodes.
Our future work includes a detailed analysis and possible
implementation of distance bounding and position verification
techniques. Furthermore, we intend to investigate the applica-
bility of our basic distance verification scheme to a number of
existing positioning algorithms.
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